This paper studies …scal federalism when voter information varies across regions.
Introduction
The most dramatic episode of centralization undertaken by the U.S. federal government achieved a striking decrease in corruption. The New Deal, by introducing federal oversight of welfare spending, eradicated the patronage and political manipulation that had hitherto characterized relief programs managed at the state and local level (Wallis 2000a , b; Wallis, Fishback, and Kantor 2006). International evidence highlights similar instances of a positive impact of political centralization on government accountability. Centralized political institutions in precolonial Africa reduced corruption and fostered the rule of law, causing a long-lasting increase in the provision of public goods that endured into the postcolonial period (Gennaioli and Rainer 2007a,b) . Blanchard and Shleifer (2001) argue that China has grown faster than Russia thanks to the greater strength of its central government compared to local politicians. While contemporary cross-country studies of decentralization and perceived corruption have yielded con ‡icting results (Treisman 2007 ; Fan, Lin, and Treisman 2009), it is clear empirically that centralization can increase government e¢ ciency and political accountability, at least under the appropriate conditions. This phenomenon is di¢ cult to understand through the lens of traditional models of …scal federalism. Oates's (1972 Oates's ( , 1999 ) classic theory does not consider the problem of imperfectly accountable politicians and posits two technological rationales for centralization: economies of scale and bene…ts from policy coordination. The subsequent literature in political economy has mostly emphasized the advantages of decentralization (Lockwood 2006 ). In particular, decentralized government is held to be more accountable, thanks to yardstick competition across local jurisdictions (Besley and Case 1995; Besley and Smart 2007) . 1 In this paper, on the other hand, we explain how centralization can in fact enhance accountability. Our approach re ‡ects for electoral incentives the fundamental intuition of gains from trade between heterogeneous agents. Voters in di¤erent regions are unequally capable of incentivizing self-interested politicians. If the regions are united in a single national polity, the central politician is mainly held accountable by the most capable voters. Hence, his incentives and performance are better than those of the average local politician.
We capture this idea through a model of political agency with imperfectly informed voters. Sel…sh politicians are entrusted with allocating the government budget between public goods and wasteful private rents. Career concerns induce the incumbent to provide a positive amount of public goods in order to signal ability and win the votes of those citizens who observe public good provision. In equilibrium, we show that politicians extract lower rents if voters are better informed, consistent with the evidence that voter information improves accountability (Besley and Burgess 2002; Ferraz and Finan 2008; Snyder and Strömberg 2010; Ponzetto 2011) . Electoral discipline has decreasing returns because the threat of being ousted from o¢ ce is less costly when rent extraction is already low. National elections, therefore, provide much better incentives and screening than local elections in the least informed regions, and not much worse than in the most informed ones. Centralization then increases overall e¢ ciency by reducing aggregate political rents.
Our model predicts the regional distribution of the e¢ ciency gains from centralization. The central government sets a uniform national policy that entails an identical level of public good provision throughout the country (Oates 1972 ; Alesina and Spolaore 1997). As a consequence, all regions whose residents have below-average political information derive a strict welfare increase from a switch from decentralized to centralized government. The net impact on better informed regions is instead ambiguous. The average information exploited in electing their rulers falls when they join the less informed parts of the union in a national election. This dilution tends to reduce accountability. On the other hand, if public goods spill over across regions, we show that all voters are keener on the ability of a central than a local politician. This keenness makes national elections more competitive, raising accountability. While the most informed regions may gain or lose from centralization, our theory entails an unambiguous relative prediction. A region's welfare gains from centralization are strictly decreasing in its residents'information.
We test this prediction of our model using panel data on air pollutant emissions across U.S. states. This series enables us to study the e¤ects of one of the most prominent instances of centralization in U.S. history since World War II (Greenstone 2004) . With the 1970 Clean Air Act Amendments, the federal government took direct responsibility for air pollution regulation, which until that point had rested primarily with states and local governments. We perform a di¤erence-in-di¤erences analysis to assess whether the federal takeover of environmental policy had a di¤erential impact on states according to their level of information.
The empirical evidence supports our theoretical prediction. The introduction of federal standards is associated with a highly signi…cant di¤erential trend. After 1970, pollutant emissions begin to decline markedly in less informed states relative to more informed ones. The …nding obtains for di¤erent recorded emissions, and it is robust to speci…cations that control for simultaneous di¤erences-in-di¤erences based on other potential determinants of pollution, such as income per capita or the size of the manufacturing sector. In line with our theory, the di¤erential reduction in emissions seems to represent a bene…t of centralization for the less informed, since we do not observe a simultaneous di¤erential reduction in economic activity.
Both theoretically and empirically, we …nd that centralization entails systematic distributional consequences that favor regions with less informed voters, whose local government is more dysfunctional. This pattern contrasts with Strömberg's (2004) …nding that discretionary New Deal spending was disproportionately allocated to more informed counties within a state. We conclude by showing that a natural extension of our theoretical framework encompasses and interprets the two opposite phenomena. Under centralization, uniformly provided public goods such as national emission standards bene…t the less informed; conversely, discretionary funds are targeted to the more informed. Our theory highlights the importance of striking a balance between the two. Without any uniformity, centralization would be welfare reducing despite the associated reduction in political rents. When instead uniform and discretionary items are in the right proportions, centralization is not only welfare increasing but also Pareto e¢ cient.
Theoretical Model

Public Good Provision and Political Agency
The economy is populated by in…nitely lived agents, whose preferences are separable over time and quasilinear across a set of public goods p = 1; :::; P . Individual i in period t derives utility
whereũ i t is utility from private consumption, and g p;t the provision of public good p. The relative importance of each good for individual i is described by the shares i p 0 such that P P p=1 i p = 1. We focus on public-good provision, treatingũ i t as an exogenous shock. Public goods are provided by a politician who allocates a given government budget b, invariant over time and subject to a balanced-budget constraint every period. Expenditure on each public good p is x p;t , and residually the politician can extract an unproductive private rent r t 0. Thus
The politician's objective is to maximize rent extraction over his term in o¢ ce. His discount factor is 2 (0; 1]. For a given level of spending, public goods are produced with technology g p;t = e p;t x p;t .
Productivity p;t represents the stochastic competence of the politician in providing good p. It is independent across public goods, and follows a …rst-order moving average process conditional on the realizations of g t and t . Taking into account the uniform aggregate shock t , the incumbent's probability of re-election is
as a function of his policy choices x t (and residually r t ). The politician understands that if he is re-elected he will have further occasions to extract rents. Denote by R their expected present value. The trade-o¤ between current and future rent extraction leads to policy choices
p for all p = 1; :::; P ,
and thus current rent extraction
In equilibrium, the probability of re-election is 1=2, because the politician does not have private information at the time of the policy choice, voters have rational expectations, and their non-policy tastes do not have a permanent bias against incumbency nor in its favor. As a consequence, the present value of re-election is
Substituting this relationship into equations 11 and 12, solving the latter, and plugging it into the former, we obtain the equilibrium allocation of the government budget. To economize on notation, we de…ne~
a convenient rescaling of the politician's discount factor. Finally, rational expectations imply that the incumbent is re-elected if and only if
Let t be an indicator variable for this condition. The competence of ruling politicians evolves according to^
where the superscripts I and C refer to the incumbent and challenger in the election at the end of period t 1. The unconditional expectation of ability is then
This completes the characterization of the stationary equilibrium of our model of political career concerns. His expected ability at providing public good p is
An increase in P J j=1 j j j p induces an increase in^ p in the sense of …rst-order stochastic dominance.
Equilibrium rents are proportional to the government budget b. Rent extraction declines as voters are more informed (@ =@ < 0), since information allows them to monitor the politician more tightly. This result accords with the empirical …nding that government performance improves with media scrutiny ( (Nannicini et al. 2010) , which facilitate respectively the acquisition and the sharing of information. Rents are also reduced when voters are more likely to be swayed by policy than non-policy considerations (@ =@ < 0). Finally, rent extraction declines when politicians are more patient (@ =@ < 0), because they are more willing to sacri…ce current bene…ts for a higher probability of remaining in o¢ ce in the future.
Intuitively, it is impossible for rents to fall to zero, since the politician's incentive to refrain from appropriating the entire current budget is entirely due to his desire to gain reelection and keep pocketing future rents. More broadly, reductions in rent extraction through electoral discipline become progressively more di¢ cult as the equilibrium rent declines. All rentdecreasing factors, namely information , competitiveness , and patience , have positive but decreasing returns (
The same factors that make elections a better incentive device also make them a better screening mechanism. The average productivity of government spending is proportional to the variance of the underlying distribution of ability (
2 ), which measures the gains available from screening. The e¤ectiveness of screening rises when voters are more informed about public-good provision (@E^ p =@ j > 0), and thus have the ability to cast their ballots on the basis of a signal of the incumbent's skill. Moreover, screening is more e¤ective when citizens are more willing to vote on the basis of observed performance, rather than out of idiosyncratic non-policy tastes (@E^ p =@ > 0). These e¤ects raise not only the expectation of ability, but its entire distribution, in the sense of …rst-order stochastic dominance. Through improvements in both political incentives and political selection, higher voter information ( ) increases the equilibrium welfare of each voter, which is given by
for each member of group j. Welfare also rises with voters'keenness on policy outcomes ( ), politicians'patience ( ), and the variance of their ability distribution ( 2 ).
The allocation of spending across public goods ( ) re ‡ects both di¤erences in preferences and di¤erences in information. A utilitarian social welfare planner would set budget shares
re ‡ecting average preferences for each public good. However, the politician is only imperfectly accountable, and speci…cally he is only held accountable by informed voters. Thus his choices deviate from social welfare optimization even beyond the extraction of a rent. The allocation of expenditure across public goods obey a weighted social welfare function in which each group's preferences are is weighted by its level of information j .
E¢ cient Centralization
The economy is divided into L regions, each inhabited by a measure-one population of homogeneous residents. There are then LP public goods: their indexing is expanded so that g l;p;t is the provision of public good p in location l at time t. Politicians are drawn independently across regions, from identical local pools.
In keeping with the classic theory of …scal federalism (Oates 1972) , we admit the possibility of externalities in public-good provision. These externalities are measured by an index
from public goods provided to his own region, but he may also derives additional utility
from public goods provided in any other region. Thus we can write individual utility
With decentralized government, in each region a local politician with ability l;p;t independently allocates the regional budget b 
This formulation implies that there are no economies of scale in public-good provision, which removes the most obvious force pushing for centralization. It also means that centralization imposes a constraint of policy uniformity: g The …rst and key result in the proposition is that if voters are heterogeneously informed ( l 6 = m for l 6 = m), and thus politicians are heterogeneously accountable, centralization has bene…cial aggregate e¤ects on accountability. The decline in rent extraction is an intuitive consequence of decreasing returns to monitoring. By joining heterogeneous regions into a single polity, centralization leads to an overall level of political information equal to the average of information across regions. For regions with low voter information, this represents a large improvement, because the increase in accountability is powerful given the low starting point of their political accountability under decentralization. For regions with high voter information, the deterioration is not equally stark, because the marginal value of information is low when it is plentiful to begin with. The aggregate e¤ect of centralization is thus an unambiguous decrease in rent extraction.
Centralization also increases political accountability if there are spillovers in public goods across regions ( l p > 0). Advantages of centralization in the presence of inter-regional externalities are present in all theories of federalism since Oates (1972) . But the classic theory only considers the bene…ts of coordination, abstracting from any political-economy considerations. Proposition 2 …nds that spillovers improve incentives even if there is no need to coordinate budget allocations because preferences are identical across regions. Political accountability improves due to the intensive margin of electoral support.
In the election, each citizen is more likely to support the incumbent if he has proved to be more capable than average. The intensity of popular support, however, depends not only on the extent of ability, but also on its importance. A voter who is informed of the incumbent's poor skills may nonetheless vote for him because of his personal likability or ideological a¢ nity. He is, however, less likely to do so as the economic stakes in the election rise. If there are public good spillovers, the stakes are indeed higher in a national than in a local election. For > 0, every voter is keener on electing a pro…cient politician at the central rather than at the regional level, because his ability will a¤ect public goods in all regions, and each voter cares about them all. Thus centralization reduces the in ‡uence of non-policy preferences on electoral outcomes, improving the monitoring value of elections.
Through the same channel, the screening value of elections also increases. Since voters are more concerned about the ability of a national than a local politician, in equilibrium they select a central government whose average ability (E^ p ) is greater. Thanks to centralization, not only wasteful rents decline, but the e¢ ciency of productive public spending simultaneously rises.
As in Oates (1972) , decentralization can be bene…cial to avoid the cost of policy uniformity when regions have heterogeneous preferences. However, Proposition 2 establishes new forces that tend to make centralization more e¢ cient than decentralization. Thus, the Decentralization Theorem holds in our model only if voters are homogeneously informed ( l = for all l). With heterogeneous information, centralization is systematically welfare increasing.
Proposition 3 Suppose that information is homogeneous ( l = for all l). Suppose that information is heterogeneous ( l 6 = m for some l 6 = m). If preferences are homogeneous ( l p = p and l p = p for all l), centralization yields higher welfare than decentralization.
The …rst three points coincide with Oates's Decentralization Theorem. When there are neither heterogeneity nor spillovers in information, these classic results obtain in spite of the distortions arising from imperfect political agency.
Without externalities, there are no bene…ts from policy coordination. With homogeneous preferences, there are no costs of policy uniformity. Furthermore, in this case imperfect agency causes the same distortions under centralization or decentralization. Constituency size a¤ects political agency through two opposing forces (Seabright 1996; Persson and Tabellini 2000) . Centralization reduces the probability that voters in any one region are pivotal in the election. Hence a central politician is less responsive to each voter's preferences than a local politician is to those of his fewer constituents. Conversely, centralization increases the scale of political rents. When the politician allocates the larger central budget instead of a smaller regional budget, re-election is more valuable. A greater value of re-election sharpens the incentives for the central politician to perform well. Proposition 3 shows that these forces are perfectly balanced. Centralization expands the budget by a factor L, while reducing the electoral clout of each region by a factor 1=L. The politician's incentives are thus invariant with respect to the scale of his constituency. Rent extraction is proportional to the government budget, as established in Proposition 1.
The second point of the Decentralization Theorem deals with the bene…ts of policy coordination. Oates (1972) assumed that local politicians maximize local welfare but cannot cooperate. In our model, even if local politicians could cooperate across regions, they would have no incentives to do so. Local politicians are uninterested in changing each other's behavior. Their only goal is to signal their own ability to their own constituents, which they do most e¤ectively by ignoring all externalities. Thus, Proposition 3 re ‡ects an endogenous inability to internalize externalities under decentralization. In addition, Proposition 2 showed that the incentives and screening both improve under centralization when there are externalities in public good provision.
Finally, the third point highlights the standard cost of a binding uniformity constraint. Centralization is costly when regions have heterogeneous preferences, because it involves a suboptimal allocation of expenditure across regions. Furthermore, with imperfect political agency a binding uniformity constraint also worsens electoral screening. Politicians'skill sets are more congruent with their constituents'preferences when they are elected locally rather than in a single national election.
Proposition 3 concludes by showing that voter information generically modi…es the …nd-ings of the Decentralization Theorem in favor of centralization. With homogeneous preferences, decentralization is strictly dominated not only when there are externalities, but also when information is heterogeneous across regions. Then it is no longer unambiguously true that decentralization is bene…cial when preferences are heterogeneous: the costs of policy uniformity can be more than o¤set by the accountability bene…ts described by Proposition 2.
The Distribution of E¢ ciency Gains
Proposition 2 highlighted the mechanisms through which centralization increases average political accountability and therefore aggregate e¢ ciency. Accordingly, Proposition 3 established that centralization is welfare-increasing from the national perspective when preferences are homogeneous. The bene…ts of centralization, however, are unevenly distributed across regions. The aggregate improvement in political accountability established by 2 is also a transfer from the more to the less informed.
Proposition 4 Suppose that preferences are homogeneous and information heterogeneous across regions ( l p = p and l p = p for all l and p; l 6 = m for some l 6 = m). If residents of region l are less informed than residents of region m, then centralization yields a greater increase in the expected provision of all public goods and thus in welfare in region l than in region m ( l < m implies E g
If furthermore there are no externalities in public good provision ( p = 0 for all p) then region l is better o¤ under centralization than decentralization if and only if its voters are less informed than average ( l , Eu
When voter information is heterogeneous, centralization reduces rent extraction by transferring political monitoring from the regions whose voters are more informed than average to those with less than average information. The more informed regions are better at incentivizing and selecting local politicians. Conversely, the less informed regions are plagued with rent-extracting and incompetent local governments. Centralization e¤ectively enables them to outsource their governance to better informed voters in other regions.
The overall impact of centralization on better informed regions is ambiguous. On the one hand, the quality of their electoral process is diluted when the constituency is expanded to include regions with less informed voters. On the other hand, in the presence of externalities ( p > 0) all voters are more likely to act on the basis of whatever information they have in a national election. While the dilution of informed voters blunts the monitoring and screening ability of the electorate, externalities from central policy decisions sharpen it. The net e¤ect is negative in the absence of spillovers, but it can be positive when they are present.
Conversely, regions with below-average information always gains from centralization. The implicit transfer of accountability e¤ected by centralization e¤ectively entails a welfareincreasing transfer of public funds, although every region contributes an equal amount (b) to of the government budget and receives an identical provision of public goods (g). In fact, the transfer is precisely a consequence of this two-sided uniformity. Under decentralization, the contributions (b) are also identical, but less informed regions su¤er much higher rent extraction and enjoy considerably lower productive government spending.
In the United States, the data con…rm that political corruption varies greatly across states (Glaeser and Saks 2006) . In Oregon, less than one public o¢ cial per million inhabitants was convicted of corruption-related crimes in an average year from 1976 to 2002. In the same period, the corruption rate was above 5 in Alaska, Mississippi, and Louisiana.
3 Proposition 4 then implies that expansion of the federal government should bene…t disproportionally the states with lower political accountability, and more precisely lower voter information. The next section tests this prediction with evidence from federal environmental policy. Suggestive empirical support for our theoretical prediction is also provided by European evidence. The European Union encompasses large disparities in the quality of government across regions and member states (Charron, Dijkstra, and Lapuente 2011). Consistent with our model, Fredriksson and Gaston (2000) conclude that an EU directive introducing uniform standards for packaging waste "was less stringent than the existing German, Danish and Dutch laws, but was signi…cantly stricter than the Greek, Irish and Portuguese requirements." Italy provides a striking example of large regional disparities in information and accountability (Putnam 1993 Durante, Labartino, and Perotti's (2011) empirical …ndings on decentralization in the Italian public university system correspond perfectly to our theory. A 1998 reform transferred responsibility for faculty hiring from the national level to the individual universities. As a result, the quality of academic recruitment fell in provinces with lower newspaper readership. Those with higher readership experienced no decline but at most a marginal improvement, implying an aggregate e¢ ciency loss from decentralization.
Evidence from the Clean Air Act
To test the fundamental empirical prediction of our model we focus on a clear discontinuity in U.S. environmental policy. Up to the 1960s, air pollution had been primarily regulated at the state and local government. The year 1970 marked a dramatic centralizing intervention by the federal government. Federal involvement rested on two pillars: the establishment of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the passage of the Clean Air Act of 1970 and subsequent amendments, which phased in national air quality standards for a set of criterion polluters. National standardization stood in sharp contrast with the previous statebased regulations, which had been adopted only by a few states, imposing very heterogenous standards (U.S. Senate, 1970) . We use the Clean Air Act, and the sharp regulatory shift it entailed, to test the distributional predictions of our model, set out in Proposition 4.
The core of our analysis considers sulfur dioxide emissions. Sulfur dioxide is a very signi…cant and potentially harmful polluter. In the United States in 1970, among anthropogenic sources, SO 2 was predominantly released by electric utilities, which accounted for almost 56% of the total emission (90% of which from coal-fueled power plants, and 10% from oil-fueled ones), followed by metals processing (15%) and industrial fuel combustion (14%), released in a variety of industrial processes involving the combustion of high-sulfur fuels. Besides contributing to acid rain along with nitrous oxides, SO 2 at relatively high levels entails signi…cantly adverse health e¤ects, as it harms pulmonary and cardiovascular functions, and, in extreme cases, may lead to premature death. Furthermore, even at much lower levels, it severely damages crops. 4 Sulfur dioxide was targeted in 1971, immediately after the passage of the Clean Air Act. After the standards were imposed, sulfur dioxide emissions declined drastically. However, the existence of a causal link between the legislation and the downward trend in emissions is still debated (Greenstone 2004 ). We do not mean to contribute to this debate by estimating the aggregate e¤ect of the policy shift. Our empirical investigation is restricted to the study of the di¤erential impact of the Clean Air Act across states. In particular, we investigate the e¤ect of citizens'information on the di¤erential trends in emission mitigation across states before and after the 1970 reform.
Data and Empirical Speci…cation
Our main outcome variable is sulfur dioxide (SO 2 ) emissions for the 48 continental U.S. states; we also consider nitrogen oxides (N O x ) emissions as a robustness check. We use the same data as in Bulte, List, Strazicich (2007) . They are part of a series covering the period 1929-1999 of state-level sulfur dioxides and nitrogen oxides emissions in short tons per capita. Bulte, List and Strazicich drew them from National Air Pollutant Emission Trends (U.S. EPA, 1994).
We measure citizens'information with newspapers circulation per capita. We constructed the panel data from annual editions of the Statistical Abstract of the United States, which in turn reports data from the Editor & Publisher International Yearbook. The …gure is available for all states annually, with the exception of 1974. In addition to availability, newspaper circulation is a particularly apt measure of voters'ability to acquire information about government policy. Up to the 1980s, newspapers were Americans' main source of political news. Moreover, newspaper reader are acknowledged to be better informed and more involved in politics than consumers of other media (Graber 1984; Putnam 1993 Putnam , 2000 Gentzkow 2006 ; Gentzkow, Shapiro, and Sinkinson 2011).
Our control variables include population, GDP, and value added from the manufacturing sector by state. All of these are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis Regional Accounts. 5 The state GDP series is only available since 1963, dictating the starting point of our sample.We consider data up to 1980, covering the …rst decade since the enactment of Clean Air Act as well as most of the prior decade, to estimate the changes in patterns induced by the reform.
Our basic analysis is a di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimate of the e¤ect of information on the reduction in emissions follosing the imposition of national air quality standards. Our outcome measure for the pollutant's concentration is the emission intensity of state GDP, and our main regression speci…cation is the following:
We include year …xed e¤ect t , state …xed e¤ects i , and a state-speci…c linear time trend
The main regressor of interest is information I i . We de…ne information at the state level, choosing 1970 as the reference year. As a robustness test, we also consider the time average over the entire sample period. We use two di¤erent but related measures of information. One is simply newspaper circulation per capita. The second is a binary variable, which equals 1 for states whose circulation is larger than the mean across states, and 0 for those below the mean.
To study the di¤erential trend in emissions after the Clean Air Act, we consider two interactions of I i . First, with a dummy P t , which takes up the value 1 if t > 1970 and 0 otherwise. This would capture a level break in the series upon the introduction of federal emission standards. Second, with a linear time trend S t , equal to t 1970 for t > 1970 and 0 otherwise. This would capture a break in the trend of emissions after the reform.
Such a gradual impact is to be expected because the regulatory transition was itself gradual and required several years. States retained a role in the implementation and in the enforcement of the national standards, and were allowed until 1975 to comply (U.S. EPA, 1995). Additional evidence of gradualism is provided by the number of operating monitors reading the concentration of air pollutants, a key factor in the enforcement process, which increased gradually throughout the 1970s (Greenstone, 2004) .
We introduce controls X by treating them exactly like our main independent variable. We begin by allowing a di¤erential impact of the Clean Air Act on the basis not of information but by income. Thus, we introduce GDP per capita as a control. As with newspaper circulation, we consider the GDP of the state in 1970, or a binary variable that equals 1 if state GDP is above the average across states. This measure is then interacted with P t and S t , while the baseline is absorbed by the state …xed e¤ect. In our full set of control, we also introduce in the same manner manufacturing value added per capita and population density.
Results
Before turning to our regression analysis, we can starkly visualize the main result in Figure 1 . The graph plots average sulfur emissions for two group of states: those with above-average newspaper circulation in 1970, and those with below-average newspaper circulation. The di¤erence-in-di¤erences emerges clearly: uninformed states have considerably higher average emissions before 1970, and start decreasing them faster than the informed states as soon as national emission standards are introduced by the federal government. The convergence is gradual, with a trend instead of level break, but dramatic. Table 1 con…rms this result in our full regression speci…cation including all controls. Columns (1), (3), and (5) report the results when I i is measured as a binary variable, as in Figure 1 ; while in columns (2), (4), and (6) I i is measured as a continuous variable.
The coe¢ cient on newspapers circulation per capita is statistically signi…cant with the expected sign for the trend e¤ect throughout the six speci…cations. Indeed, the time trend appears to be the most obvious …t to our natural experiment. As previously discussed, the history of the Clean Air Act suggests that air quality standards were phased in gradually. The binary information measure, in any case, displays a signi…cant level break in addition to its signi…cant trend break.
The inclusion of controls does not qualitatively a¤ect the results. In fact, the estimated coe¢ cients and standard errors show very small quantitative changes, strengthening the signi…cance of the empirical support for the theoretically predicted role of information.
As a robustness test, as anticipated, we repeat the same analysis with a slightly di¤erent measure of information. The continuous information variable is now, for each state, the average value of circulation in the 1963-1980 period. The binary variable takes the value 1 if the average value of circulation for the state in the 1963-1980 period exceeds the mean of the average values for all the states in the same period. Figure 2 and Table 2 show the results. As in Table 1 , the trend e¤ect for newspaper circulation is signi…cant in all six speci…cation, and the coe¢ cients are only slightly reduced by the inclusion of control variables.
GDP is signi…cant, although now as a trend e¤ect and only under the binary measure of information; its sign is opposite with respect to the baseline speci…cation. Combining the twelve speci…cations, we observe a robust e¤ect of the information variable (in trends), as opposed to a weaker and less persistent e¤ect of GDP. Notwithstanding concerns of correlation between newspaper circulation and GDP, the inclusion of the GDP in the estimation a¤ects only marginally our estimator of the di¤erential e¤ect of information.
Overall, the results provide a clear empirical support for the notion, predicted by our theory, that the Clean Air Act had a di¤erential impact across states, and that the di¤erence depends on the level of information. Our results highlight that centralization improved the quality of air in states less informed than the average.
An extensive literature has assessed the bene…ts accruing to the population as a result of the CAA-induced emissions mitigation. Chay and Greenstone (2005) estimate the effect of the improvement in the quality of air on housing prices. By using data on total suspended particulate (TSP) air pollution, they …nd that better quality of air causes a substantial increase in house prices. Their welfare calculation shows that the mid-1970s TSPs regulation provided a $45 billion aggregate increase in house values. 6 Chay and Greenstone (2003) analyze the relation between air pollution and infant mortality, and …nd a signi…cant positive association. They estimate that a reduction in TSPs by 1 g=m 3 is associated to approximately 200 additional infants surviving to one year of age.
As a further check of the robustness of our results, we repeat the entire analysis using a time series of emissions for nitrogen oxides N O x . Sources of nitrogen oxides di¤er remarkably from those of sulfur dioxide. While the latter is released almost exclusively by stationary sources (in 1970, the transportation sector accounted for less than 2% of total emissions), the single main source for the nitrogen oxides is represented by on-road vehicles, which accounted for 35% of total emissions in the United States in 1970, as compared to 23% for electric utilities and 20% for industrial fuel combustion. The adverse health e¤ects of nitrogen oxides primarily involve respiratory and cardiovascular problems, similarly to sulfur dioxides.
National air quality standards for N O 2 were imposed in 1971. However, speci…c standard for N O x expressly targeting automobile emissions (consisting in national vehicle emission limits on N O x emissions) were phased in starting in 1973 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 2000), and applied to an increasingly large portion of the United States vehicle ‡eet over the years, as old cars were scrapped and replaced by new ones. 7 Changes in the nitrogen oxides emissions materialized, after 1970, in an even more gradual way than for sulfur dioxide. There are, therefore, reasons to expect a trend e¤ect to be visible after 1970 rather than a level e¤ect. Figures 3 and 4 show the trend in N O x emissions intensity of GDP after splitting the states into two groups according to whether their newspaper circulation was above or below average in 1970. The …gures suggest that a discontinuity, in this case, might be associated with the 1972 vehicle emission limits rather than with the Clean Air Act itself. Despite this potential concern, Tables 3 and 4 yield results that are remarkably similar to those in Tables  1 and 2 respectively, replacing the sulfur dioxide series with the one for nitrogen oxides. The coe¢ cients on the newspaper circulation trend interactions are statistically signi…cant at the 1% level for all 12 speci…cations. Again, GDP has a less clear e¤ect.
Discussion
A legitimate concern with environmental regulation is that clean air may come at the cost of a deterioration in local economic conditions, as plants choose to relocate away from tightly regulated areas. Previous research has shown that air quality regulation indeed a¤ects industrial location and is associated with reductions in employment, investment and shipments at the local level (Henderson 1996; Becker and Henderson 2002 ). In addition, tight standards determine a signi…cant reduction in total factor productivity for polluting plants (Greenstone, List and Syverson, 2011). We might then suspect that the di¤erential emission reduction following the Clean Air Act could be mirrored by a simultaneous di¤erential negative impact on economic activity in the uninformed states, which recorded the largest emission reductions.
However, our analysis …nds no evidence of such a di¤erential e¤ect. Figure 5 shows the series of GDP per capita for the two groups of states, more and less informed than the average across states in 1970. Unlike emissions, GDP per capita does not display any clear pattern of di¤erences-in-di¤erences between informed and uninformed states before and after 1970. A very similar argument can be made for the share of manufacturing in state GDP. Figure  6 shows its evolution for the two groups of states. Federal intervention in environmental regulation does not seem to be associated with any di¤erential impact on the manufacturing share by information. The pattern of the data then suggest that the di¤erential impact of the Clean Air Act can plausibly be interpreted according to our theoretical model. Before 1970, under state and local governments rule, uninformed states were facing a problem of bad regulation. They were subject to excessively loose standards (or no standards whatsoever), to the point that, when the federal government stepped in and prescribed tighter regulatory requirements, it was able to do so at a very limited (and possibly nil) di¤erential cost for the states involved. Federal standards may have been costly for the entire nation, but they do not appear to have been costlier for the uninformed states that reaped the greatest declines in emissions.
Suggestive evidence of a problem of bad regulation by the uninformed states can also be gleaned from direct measures of local government activity. We can look at two di¤erent measures of regulatory inputs: expenditures by state and local governments for air quality control, and actual regulations implemented by states and local governments before 1970.
Consistent with the public good nature of air pollution, Henderson (1996) …nds that a larger expenditure in the state on abatement activities is associated with better outcomes in terms of air quality. 8 We obtain direct state expenditure from the U. 9 The 1970 policy shift may have fostered a convergence, in percentage terms, of state and local government expenditures in air pollution regulation. In line with our theoretical model and with our main empirical result, this suggests a di¤erential e¤ect of the reform on the expenditure levels, based on the level of citizens'information. As a second measure of regulatory input, we use the total number of standards implemented at the state level before 1970. Our source are the hearings of the subcommittee on air and water pollution of the United States senate (U.S. Senate, 1970) . The document reports the standards adopted by states and local governments before 1970 on ten pollutants. 10 We count the number of pollutants that each state had regulated prior to 1970, and we then divide the states into two groups according to the usual criterion based on newspaper circulation in 1970. We …nd that informed states had, on average, adopted four standards, while uninformed states had, on average, adopted three standards only. The document also reports the number of states that had proposed or adopted emission standards for sulfur dioxide and for total suspended particulate as a result of the provision of the 1967 Air Quality Act. 11 We again divide the states into informed and uninformed based on the average level of newspaper circulation in 1970, and …nd that 50% of the informed states had proposed or adopted emission standards for the two pollutants, as opposed to only 25% among the uninformed. This suggests that more informed states had more standards before the federal intervention. The uniform national standards imposed after the Clean Air Act would ipso facto trigger a regulatory convergence, entailing a greater improvement in the standards of the less informed and less regulated states.
Centralization without Uniformity
Section 2 presented a model of political and …scal centralization in which public goods are uniformly provided across regions by the central government, and di¤erentiation only occurs under decentralized local governments. The assumption of a uniform national policy is natural vis à vis the empirical analysis of Section 3, since the very purpose of the 1970 Clean Air Act was to introduce uniform national standards for regulating pollution and its abatement. Moreover, the uniformity assumption has been standard in the literature on …scal federalism since Oates (1972) . Nonetheless, imposing a uniformity constraint on centralized public-good provision is not necessarily realistic in all settings. E.g., discretionary federal spending is not required to be homogeneously spent across states, almost by de…nition of discretionality. Thus, Lockwood (2002) and Besley and Coate (2003) have modelled …scal federalism under the alternative hypothesis that the central government can arbitrarily vary the provision of public goods across regions. A straightforward extension of our theoretical framework includes both public goods whose centralized provision is subject to a uniformity constraint, as in Section 2, and others that the central government can instead provide in di¤erent amounts to di¤erent regions. Letting the former constitute the set U and the latter the set D, the central government budget constraint becomes 
The model then features two opposite distributive patterns. As established by Proposition 4, uniformly provided public goods (p 2 U) imply a bene…t of centralization for less informed regions. The empirical evidence in Section 3 bears out this prediction, showing that national air quality standards adopted by the EPA bene…ted disproportionately states with lower information Conversely, however, unconstrained discretional spending tends to favor more politically in ‡uential group. In our model, political in ‡uence stems from information, since more knowledgeable voters provide more of the politicians'incentives. As a consequence, better informed regions bene…t disproportionately from non-uniform public goods (p 2 D), which are equally …nanced by all taxpayers. This pattern is consistent with evidence on the regional allocation of discretionary government spending during the New Deal (Strömberg 2004 ). Responding to voters' information, state governors directed more public funds to counties with a greater share of radio listeners.
The balance between the two countervailing distributional forces depends on the relative importance of the two types of public goods, which is summarized by the welfare weight of public goods that the central government must provide uniformly:
Striking the appropriate balance emerges as a crucial requirement of centralization. Its absence is perilous: the welfare gains described by Proposition 3 are no longer assured without it. Its presence is bene…cial: by modulating the distribution of the accountability gains between informed and uninformed reason, it can make centralization Pareto e¢ cient even in the absence of externalities, despite Proposition 4.
Proposition 5 Suppose that preferences are homogeneous, information is heterogeneous, and there are no externalities ( l p = p and l p = 0 for all l and p; l 6 = m for some l 6 = m).
1. There exists a threshold U 2 0; 1 C such that centralization yields higher aggregate welfare than decentralization if and only if U U .
There exists a threshold
2 > 0 such that centralization with an optimal uniformity constraint Pareto dominates decentralization if U = 1 C and 2 2 .
The …rst result highlights that a uniformity constraint, which creates costs of centralization in the classic theory of …scal federalism (Oates 1972) , is instead necessary for the e¢ ciency of centralization with heterogeneously informed voters. Centralization increases overall accountability and reduces aggregate rent extraction. When public goods are uniformly provided by the central government, the resulting increase in productive public spending bene…ts the regions who need it most, because their local politicians extract higher rents under decentralization. Indeed, uniformity induces an egalitarian inter-regional allocation, which is precisely what aggregate welfare maximization requires. The uniformity constraint is not binding for a benevolent central social planner when preferences are homogeneous Instead, all public goods not subject to the uniformity constraint are provided preferentially to the most informed regions. Their provision is exactly proportional to the level of information:
The resulting geographic misallocation of government expenditures can be more ine¢ cient than rent extraction. The share of public goods whose centralized provision is not subject to the uniformity constraint (1 U ) measures the share of the central budget that better informed regions can appropriate. In the limit as U ! 0, uniformed voters certainly su¤er more under centralization, when their taxes are channeled to public spending in better informed regions, than under decentralization, when they are defrauded by rent-extracting local politicians. The welfare losses of redistribution across heterogeneously informed voters loom larger than those of imperfect political agency. As evidence of such welfare costs, Ponzetto (2011) has shown that knowledge asymmetries across voters can account for a Pareto ine¢ cient protectionist bias of trade policy.
Proposition 5 highlights that the uniformity constraint can mediate between e¢ ciency and redistribution. If it can be set optimally at the constitutional table, centralization may be made Pareto dominant. Better incentives for ruling politicians create an aggregate surplus that can be shared across regions. For 1 U C , any region with more than average information ( l > ) prefers the budget allocation induced by centralization. Gaining control of centrally provided goods not subject to the uniformity constraint (1 U ) is worth more than a decrease in rent extraction to Beyond the budget allocation, centralization inevitably improves the selection of politicians in less informed regions, and worsens it in more informed ones. Centralization can be Pareto e¢ cient so long as the resulting gains and losses are small, because politicians'ability is not too variable (low 2 ). Then the main problem in political agency is rent extraction (moral hazard) rather than the screening of more skilled politician (adverse selection). In this case, centralization can always provide a Pareto e¢ cient improvement in accountability.
Conclusions
Political accountability and the quality of government vary across regions within a country like the United States, and across member states of international organizations like the European Union. In this paper, we have shown that such regional di¤erences imply that centralization increases political accountability. Our model emphasizes the role of di¤erences in voters'information. Rent-seeking politicians have better incentives when their constituents are more informed about the provision of public goods. We have shown that electoral discipline has decreasing returns. Therefore, a central politician answerable to the whole national electorate extracts lower rents than a collection of local politicians, some monitored tightly by well-informed voters and some loosely by poorly-informed constituents. Hence, we have found that centralization is bene…cial whenever voter information is heterogeneous across regions. This result can help to explain the steady growth of the federal government over the history of the United States, and the sharp increase in the scope and extent of the powers of the European Union since the 1970s (Alesina, Angeloni, and Schuknecht 2005).
Our model also predicts distributional consequences of centralization when regions have di¤erent levels of information, even without di¤erences in income. When the central government provides public goods uniformly across the nation, the bene…ts of centralization are monotone decreasing in voter information. We have tested this prediction by analyzing the di¤erential impact across U.S. states of the Clean Air Act of 1970. Beforehand, environmental regulation was largely in the hands of states and local governments. Beginning in 1970, the federal government took charge and started introducing uniform national standards. We have found signi…cant and robust evidence of di¤erences-in-di¤erences. Consistent with our theoretical model, centralization of environmental policy induced a di¤erential decline in pollution in less informed states, relative to better informed ones.
Our …nding that centralization bene…ts the least informed regions hinges on our focus on uniform policies, both in our baseline model and in empirical evidence from pollutant emission standards. In our theoretical framework, we have shown conversely that if the central politician can di¤erentiate local public good provision across regions, he targets the most informed. While uniform policy entails a transfer of accountability from the informed to the uninformed, discretionary spending re ‡ects a transfer of power from the uninformed to the informed. Thus we have identi…ed the balancing role of a uniformity requirement for centralgovernment policies. Some uniformity is necessary for centralization to be welfare increasing. A carefully calibrated constraint can even ensure the Pareto e¢ ciency of centralization.
A Derivations and Proofs
A.1. Proof of Proposition 1
The budget allocation and the expectation of the incumbent's ability are derived in the body of the text. The cumulative distribution function of^ p;t is
Pr ^ p;t = Pr t 1 "
where F " (") is the cumulative distribution function of " p;t and f " (") its probability density function. Since
an increase in P J j=1 j j j p induces an increase in^ p in the sense of …rst-order stochastic dominance.
A.2. Centralization and Decentralization
Under centralization, Proposition 1 implies that rent extraction is
and the expected ability of a central politician is
The relative shares of each local public good are
Welfare in region l is
and aggregate welfare is
Under decentralization, Proposition 1 implies that rent extraction is
and the expected ability of a local politician is
and aggregate welfare is 
which can be written
a strictly decreasing and strictly convex function of x > 0:
The …rst inequality follows from convexity by Jensen's inequality and holds strictly if l is heterogeneous across regions. The second inequality follows from monotonicity and holds strictly if l p > 0 for some l and p.
A.3..2 Ability
Average e¢ ciency in providing public good p is higher under centralization if and only if
The right-hand side is weakly lower than the left-hand side, and strictly lower if 
The Decentralization Theorem
Suppose that information is homogeneous ( l = for all l). Then under centralization
while under decentralization
and 
and
Under decentralization
Centralization achieves the optimal allocation of productive expenditures, while decentralization does not unless p is homogeneous across goods.
Thus welfare is lower under decentralization due to increased rent extraction, lower government e¢ ciency, and also misallocation of expenditures across public goods unless p is homogeneous across goods.
3. If there are no externalities and preferences are heterogeneous ( 
Decentralization achieves the optimal allocation of productive expenditures, while centralization does not. Moreover, decentralization achieves a better screening of politi-
A.4..2 E¢ cient Centralization
Suppose that preferences are homogeneous ( l p = p and l p = p for all l). Then under centralization
1. The welfare cost of rent extraction falls with centralization:
a strictly increasing and strictly concave function of x > 0:
The …rst inequality follows from convexity by Jensen's inequality and holds strictly if l is heterogeneous across regions. The second inequality follows from monotonicity and holds strictly if p > 0 for some p.
2. Average ability increases under centralization for all public goods, as proved in Proposition 2:
3. Centralization achieves the optimal allocation of productive expenditures, while decentralization does not unless p is homogeneous across public goods.
Thus centralization increases welfare whenever information is heterogeneous ( l 6 = m for some l 6 = m) or there are externalities in the provision of public goods ( p > 0 for some p).
A.5. Proof of Proposition 4
Suppose that preferences are homogeneous (
under decentralization, and 
Similarly for residents'welfare
If furthermore thee are no externalities ( p = 0 for all p) then under decentralization
If and only if l then 
A.6. Proof of Proposition 5
The allocation under decentralization is una¤ected by a U < 1. Aggregate welfare is
From Proposition 1, rent extraction under centralization is
Then aggregate welfare is greater under centralization if
Region l gains from centralization if
The function f (x) log 1 + 2~ x U log x (A62) has a unique minimum
and convexity
the left-hand side of condition A61 is a convex function of l 2 [0; 1] with minimum at l = . This also proves that
Moreover, let m = arg min l=1;:::;L l : l > .
Then for
centralization Pareto dominates decentralization for U = C . Any region with l = is always indi¤erent between the two. Region m is also indi¤erent if 2 = 2 , and strictly prefers centralization otherwise. Any regions with l < or l > m strictly prefer centralization. 
